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The Regulation of Commercial Radio Broadcasting
in the United Kingdom
Timothy H. Jones*
The regulation of commercial radio broadcasting in the United
Kingdom is about to enter a period of rapid change. The Govern-
ment is committed to increasing the number of commercial radio sta-
tions and to a measure of deregulation. Legislation to effect these
changes is expected in the near future. Up to the present time, an
independent agency, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA
or Authority), has strictly regulated commercial radio broadcasting.'
Commercial radio services have been restricted to those of a "local"
character.2 This regulation of Independent Local Radio (ILR) is
generally regarded to have been a failure, and the IBA's effectiveness
as a regulatory agency has been called into question on numerous
occasions. 3 Many of the problems which face ILR are the result of its
origins and development over the past seventeen years, since its in-
ception in 1972.
This article critically examines the history of the IBA's regula-
tion of ILR, describes the problems currently besetting ILR, and out-
lines some of the reforms which have been suggested.
I. The Independent Broadcasting Authority
A. Introduction
The IBA is the public body authorized by Parliament 4 to organ-
ize and supervise the Independent Broadcasting System. 5 In addi-
* Lecturer in Law, U. of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland, United Kingdom. LL.B. 1983,
Birmingham University; M.Phil. 1985, Cambridge University.
I Sound Broadcasting Act, 1972, ch. 31, § 2(l), reprinted in 42 Halsbury's Statutes of
England (3d ed. Continuation Vol. 1972).
2 The term "local" is not defined in detail in legislation. See infra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text. In practice, the term means that each commercial radio station broad-
casts to a specific geographical area, most commonly a large town or city.
3 See, e.g., TIlE ECONOMIST INFORMATICS LTD., RADIO BROADCASTING IN THE U.K.
(1984) (commissioned by Association of Independent Radio Contractors Ltd.); ADAM
SMITH INSTITUTE, OMEGA REPORT: COMMUNICATIONS POLICY (1984).
4 Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, §§ 1-3, reprinted in 45 Halsbury's Statutes (4th ed.
1985).
.5 The term Independent Broadcasting System is used to describe commercial radio
and television services as regulated by the IBA.
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tion to ILR, this system consists of Independent Television (ITV).6
Both ILR and ITV are part of a two-tier system comprised of the IBA
and a number of private companies. The radio stations are owned by
private companies who enter into contracts with the IBA to provide
local radio services. 7 Both are financed by the sale of advertising
time. The Independent Broadcasting System is almost wholly de-
pendent upon advertising revenue for its financing. Broadcast serv-
ices are paid for by the sale of "spot" advertising time by the
program companies.8 The IBA obtains its income from rentals paid
by the program companies under the terms of their contracts with
the Authority.
The ILR companies are subject to financial conditions imposed
by the Broadcasting Act" and their contracts with the IBA, in addi-
tion to those which flow from company law. The initial funds re-
quired by the companies are found in the normal way; that is, by the
issue of shares or acceptance of loans from third parties. The ILR
companies must therefore seek to secure an income from the sale of
advertising time which is sufficient to meet the cost of their opera-
tions and to provide a reasonable return for their shareholders.
The IBA consists of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and ten
other Members. At present, its existence is guaranteed by statute
until 1996,'n subject to extension by statutory order.'' The Home
Secretary appoints all the Members.' 2 Three of the Members are
specifically appointed to make the interests of Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland, respectively, their special responsibility.'13 A
Member holds office for a fixed period, not exceeding five years.14
With regard to ILR, the 1981 Broadcasting Act lays down four
main functions for the IBA: selection and appointment of the pro-
gram companies; ' 5 supervision of the programming;I l i control of the
amount and content of the advertising;"7 and transmission of all the
ITV is the name given to commercial television (as opposed to the BBC, which is
run ats a public corporation) in the U.K.
7 These contain the contractors' basic broadcasting obligations as well as some ad-
imnistrative detail. The basic contractual reqtirements repeat the key provisions of the
1981 Broadcasting Act.
8 "Spot" advertising is when a distinct portion of time is sold to an advertiser. It can
be contrasted to the use of advertising magazine programs, where advertisements would
be shown continuously for a longer time, up to half-an-hour, perhaps.
1) One such condition is the payment of rental to the Authority to cover transmission
and administrative costs. See Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 32.
I Id., ch. 68, § 2().
1 1 Id. § 2(5).
12 Id. § 1(1), sched. I. The Home Secretary is referred to as the Secretary of State in
the Broadcasting Act of 1981.
I: d. § 1(2).
Id. § 2(l).
15 Id. § 3.
I; d. § 4.
17 Id. §§ 8-9.
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programs and services.' 8 The functions of the program contractors
are to provide the program material' 9 and to raise revenue from the
sale of advertising time to provide the finances on which the system
depends.2 0
B. Functions of the Authority
The major role of the IBA is to attempt to reconcile the com-
mercial interests of the broadcasting companies with the public in-
terest. The main aspect of this role is to make sure that the pursuit
of commercial objectives does not become the companies' dominant
activity to the detriment of program standards. Equally, the Author-
ity must make sure that any requirements which it imposes on the
broadcasting companies' output of programs remain compatible
with a successful appeal to a substantial portion of the audience.
The IBA represents an example of the traditional British compro-
mise between tight state control and unfettered commercial activity.
The IBA became responsible for the development of ILR as a
result of the 1972 Sound Broadcasting Act, which first introduced
local commercial radio to the United Kingdom. 2' This Act renamed
the Independent Television Authority (ITA) as the IBA and gave it
the powers to establish "local sound broadcasting services," 2 2 now
known as ILR.
ILR is part of the public service broadcasting system of the
United Kingdom. The precise meaning of the "public service" con-
cept of broadcasting has proved to be a fruitful topic for debate, but,
in essence, it means that broadcasting is not determined simply by
market forces in terms either of programming or of access to the
broadcast services.2 3 Two further aspects of the public service con-
cept are that broadcasting is to be used for the benefit of the public
as a whole, rather than for the benefit of a minority, and that the
broadcast service should be of a high standard. Various implications
as regards the regulation of broadcasting flow from this concept of
public service. In the case of the IBA, this concept means that the
IBA's responsibility for broadcasting is that of a trustee for the pub-
lic interest and that it is independent of government in its decision-
making. The relationship between the IBA and the Government
should be at arms-length, with the independence and integrity of the
Authority being respected. There are also positive duties imposed
on the IBA to provide a certain type and standard of service. The
18 Id. § 3.
19, Id. § 20.
20 Id. § 21.
21 Sound Broadcasting Act, 1972, ch. 31, § 2(I).
22 See Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 2(2)(a).
23 Baldwin, Cave & Jones, The Regulation of Independent Local Radio and Its Reform, 7
INT'. RE v. L. & ECON. 177, 179 (1987).
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report of the Committee on Financing the British Broadcasting Cor-
poration (BBC) suggested that "the best operational definition of
public service is simply any major modification of purely commercial
provision resulting from public policy."' 24 The Committee noted
that the scope of public service should vary with the state of broad-
casting itself. This limited concept of public service is far from help-
ful if an attempt is to be made to clarify what the present implications
of the concept are. Public service broadcasting is better understood
as "imposing requirements on broadcasters not simply to refrain
from transmitting material which is inaccurate, misleading or unsuit-
able, but positively to provide wide-ranging programmes of qual-
ity."' 25 This view of public service broadcasting envisions a strict
regulatory regime for broadcasters, with positive requirements im-
posed in relation to program content and style. This is the approach
which lies behind many of the provisions of the Broadcasting Act.
The 1981 Broadcasting Act attempts to incorporate the essence of
public service broadcasting into the function and duties of the IBA.
Section 2 of the Act states:
The function of the Authority shall be to provide, in accordance with
this Act . . . television and local sound broadcasting services, addi-
tional in each case to those of the B.B.C. and of high quality (both as
to the transmission and as to the matter transmitted), for so much of
the United Kingdom . . .as may from time to time be reasonably
practicable.
It shall be the duty of the Authority-
(a) to provide the television and local sound broadcasting
services as a public service for disseminating information, education
and entertainment;
(b) to ensure that the programmes broadcast by the Authority
in each area maintain a high general standard in all respects (and in
particular in respect of their content and quality), and a proper bal-
ance and wide range in their subject matter, having regard both to
the programmes as a whole and also to the days of the week on
which, and the times of the day at which, the programmes are broad-
cast; and
(c) to secure a wide showing or (as the case may be) hearing
for programmes of merit.
2 6
Requirements such as these reflect what is known as the "princi-
ple of universality, ' 1 7 which is an important aspect of public service
broadcasting. According to this principle, broadcast services should
attempt to provide some programming of appeal to every member of
the listening or viewing public, because spectrum scarcity restricts
24 REPORT OF THE COMMIrIEE ON FINANCING THE B.B.C., 1986, CMND. SER. 5, No.
9824, at 130 [hereinafter FINANCING THE B.B.C.]. "Purely commercial provision" means
that broadcasting companies are allowed to pursue profits unrestrained by governmental
regulation. There is no limitation placed on their ability to sell listeners to advertisers.
25 RADIO: CHOICES AND OPPORTUNITIES, 1987, CMND. SER. -, No. 92, at 6.
26 Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 2(2).
27 RADIO: CHOICES AND OPPORTUNITIES, 1987, CMND. SER.-, No. 92 $ 1.14, at 6.
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the number of possible services. The principle also requires that
news and coverage of socially controversial topics be politically im-
partial in character. Certain material cannot be broadcast, such as
material which would be an incitement to crime or highly offensive.
It may also be necessary, as in the case of ILR, to broadcast a propor-
tion of programs in minority languages.
1. Selection and Appointment of the Program Companies
One of the IBA's most important functions is that of choosing
the program contractor. 28 The Annan Committee 29 recognized this
fact when it stated that "the most important way in which they [the
IBA] exercise their watching brief is by selecting the company which
in their belief will give the best service to its region .. .and then by
awarding it the franchise." '3 0 The selection of a particular contractor
from competing applicants is entirely a matter for the Authority.
Among the relevant considerations are financial strength, the extent
of local support, and past performance or future potential. 31 Other
important decisions within the discretion of the IBA are the determi-
nation of the areas to be advertised and the requirements of the ser-
vice to be provided by contractors. Among the relevant factors in
this context are financial circumstances, technical requirements, and
the character of the region to be served. 32
2. Supervision of Programming
Although not itself involved in program making, the IBA is an-
swerable to Parliament and to the public for everything which ITV
and ILR transmit. As already noted, the IBA's function under the
Broadcasting Act is to provide local sound broadcasting services of
high quality, "both as to transmission and as to the matter transmit-
ted." 33 The Act imposes a statutory duty on the IBA to ensure that
the programs provide a proper balance of information, education,
and entertainment; 34 "a high general standard in all respects, ' 3 5
and, so far as possible, accuracy in news; due impartiality in matters
of political and industrial controversy; and the avoidance of offense
to good taste and decency.3" The programs have to be made avail-
28 For a full discussion of this function, see Baldwin, Cave &Jones, supra note 23, at
178.
29 This is the committee which produced the report cited infra note 30. The Chair-
man was Lord Annan.
30 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF BROADCASTING, 1977, CMND. SER. 5,
No. 6753, at 192 [hereinafter FUTURE OF BROADCASTING1.
31 Baldwin, Cave & Jones, supra note 23, at 182.
32 Id. at 185-86.
33 Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 2(1).
34 Id. § 2(2)(a).
35 Id. § 2(2)(b).
3 ; Id. § 2(2).
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able to as much of the United Kingdom as possible.3 7
Each ILR company has to observe the requirements of the
Broadcasting Act, the terms of its contract with the IBA, and the IBA
requirements that stem from these sources. The IBA examines pro-
gram schedules in advance of broadcasting and monitors the output.
This monitoring process includes audience research.38
The IBA's role in the supervision of programming, however, is
considerably more expansive that that of simply imposing statutory
and contractual duties on the ILR companies. The IBA is closely
involved in the formulation of program policy and in the process of
program planning.9' In this way the Authority has a more positive,
proactive involvement than that of a program censor. This task of
examining program proposals and of making subjective qualitative
judgments is an unenviable one. Having to perform such a function
makes the IBA an easy target for critics who may question the legiti-
macy of its decisions.
The IBA's powers of direction over the ILR companies are un-
doubtedly considerable, but the mere exercise of such powers will
not lead to the desired end result of high quality programs. To
achieve this end, the IBA must be concerned with the creation of the
conditions in which a good service will be produced and must en-
courage quality in the variety of ways available to it. This encourage-
ment takes the form of a dialogue between the IBA and the ILR
companies. The Authority makes known to the companies its gen-
eral view on the quality of companies' output and effectiveness. 40
The IBA's view emerges from a continuing assessment of programs
in the light of audience research, comments and complaints from the
listening public, 41 and judgments made by the staff and Members of
the Authority. 42
The more negative aspects of the IBA's control of program con-
tent derive from the particular duties which the Authority is given
under the Broadcasting Act. The ILR Notes of Guidance contains the
specific rules relating to program standards.43 The Notes of Guidance
assembles the outcome of discussions between the IBA and the com-
panies on many program matters over the years, including possible
37 Id. § 2(1).
38 Id. § 45.
39 See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
40 This dialogue normally occurs on a relatively informal basis. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT
BROADCASTING AUTHORITY, THE ILR SERVICE (1984).
"Output and effectiveness" is a pretentious way of describing programming.
41 The IBA is empowered to undertake audience research. Broadcasting Act, 1981,
ch. 68, § 45. Complaints could be received directly by the Authority or be referred to it by
a radio station. The exercise of judgment by the Authority would seem to be inevitable.
42 Id. § 4.
43 These rules comprise a body of internal regulations produced by the IBA.
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offense to good taste and decency, accuracy, privacy, fairness, impar-
tiality, crime, and politics.
The Notes of Guidance covers highly controversial issues, and it is
within these areas of possible controversy that the program compa-
nies tend to be most jealous of their own editorial role alongside the
statutory responsibility of the IBA. The Authority, therefore, must
perform a neat balancing act to avoid being a purely negative and
restrictive influence on program companies. 44 The regulations in
the Notes of Guidance are intended to give the program companies the
greatest possible freedom of action within the Authority's interpreta-
tion of the terms of the Act. These regulations stress the prepared-
ness of the IBA to discuss individual problems on an ad hoc basis, 4 5
and this dialogue is one of the more important functions which the
Authority fulfills.
3. Control of Advertising
The IBA controls all the advertising transmitted on ILR. It
makes certain that the frequency, amount, and nature of the adver-
tisements are in accordance with the Broadcasting Act and with the
rules and standards laid down by the IBA. The Authority also regu-
lates the frequency and duration of the advertising intervals to en-
sure that they do not detract from the statutory requirement that the
medium be one of information, education, and entertainment. 46
All advertisements have to comply with the IBA Code of Adver-
tising Standards and Practice, 47 which is drafted in consultation with
the IBA's Advertising Advisory Committee. 48 Specialist staff49 at the
IBA and the Independent Television Companies Association, which
regulates radio companies' advertisements, also have to satisfy them-
44 See generally R. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE PRICE FREEZE
(1978) (dilemma between stringency and accommodation in the implementation of a statu-
tory mandate).
45 INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY, ILR PROGRAMMING NOTES OF Gui-
DANCE-FORWARD 1, 3-6 (Apr. 1980).
46 Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 3.
47 INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY, THE I.B.A. CODE OF ADVERTISING STAN-
DARDS AND PRACTICE (1975).
48 The committee must be:
[S]o constituted as to be representative of both-
(i) organisations, authorities and persons concerned with standards of
conduct in the advertising of goods and services . . . and
(ii) the public as consumers, to give advice to the Authority with a view
to the exclusion of misleading advertisements. . . and otherwise as to the
principles to be followed in connection with the advertisements.
Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 16(2)(b).
The Act provides in relevant part: "The functions of the committee . . . shall include
the duty of keeping under review the [Code of Advertising Standards and Practice] . . . and
submitting to the Authority recommendations as to any alterations which appear to them
to be desirable." Id. § 16(3).
41) Specialist staff comes from the IBA's Advertising Control Division and those in-
volved in copy control at ITV stations.
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selves that advertisements comply with the law, that they meet all the
provisions contained in the Code, and that advertisers' claims have
been substantiated.
The IBA and, on occasion, the Government are responsible for
changes to the Code and to matters of taste and truthfulness. The
Broadcasting Act requires the IBA to consult from time to time with
the Home Secretary as to the classes and designation of advertise-
ments which must not be broadcast, and to carry out any directions
the Home Secretary may give them in those respects. 50 The IBA
also has the responsibility to regulate programs funded by non-
broadcasters (that is, sponsorship). 5 1
4. Transmission of the Programs
Responsibility for transmission of program services has long
been recognized as an essential part of the Authority's functions. In
the White Paper on Television Policy, which was published in No-
vember 1953 before the ITA was formed, the then Government rec-
ognized that the body regulating the new service would need to own
and operate the transmitting stations. 52 The IBA's continued re-
sponsibility for transmission gives it ultimate control over what is
broadcast and enables it to plan the transmitter network so as to
achieve the Broadcasting Act's requirement of bringing the services
to as much of the country as is reasonably practicable.
The IBA's main engineering functions are:
(1) to plan the transmitter networks, their frequencies, assign-
ments, and the distribution networks;
(2) to plan and build all transmitting stations radiating ITV
and ILR programs;
(3) to operate and maintain these transmitting stations;
(4) to ensure transmissions of a high quality; and
(5) to maintain a specialized program of engineering research
in order to keep the Independent Broadcasting System up-to-date in
technological development. 53
II. The Development of Independent Local Radio
A. Origins of Independent Local Radio
In the early days of radio broadcasting in the United Kingdom,
there was general acceptance of the view that because the "social and
political possibilities" of broadcasting were as great as its technical
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 BROADCASTING MEMORANDUM ON TELEVISION PoLIcY, 1953, CMND. SER. 4, No.
9005 at 7.
53 See Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, §§ 2(2)(b), 3.
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potential, the new form of communication should advance the inter-
ests of the whole nation and not just promote the financial interests
of commercial companies. 54 This view that broadcasting should be
run as a public service owes much to the political and social environ-
ment of the time. Among the factors contributing to the public ser-
vice view of broadcasting were "widespread dissatisfaction with the
ad hoc nature of industrial competition" in the early part of the cen-
tury;55 the growth of public corporations exercising governmental
control over utilities in these same years; and the desire of govern-
ment not to be seen as acting unfairly by giving a monopoly to a
single commercial enterprise. 56
Proponents of the public service view of broadcasting believed
that a noncommercial monopoly in broadcasting was essential if high
standards were to be maintained and that the only alternative to a
public monopoly was the broadcasting chaos which had reigned in
the United States, where, according to Ronald Coase, there was "no
coordination, no standard, no guiding policy." 57 Furthermore, these
proponents believed that a radio service financed by advertising was
incompatible with a wide ranging broadcasting system operating in
the public interest. 58
There were, however, those who held very different views about
the aims of broadcasting and were attracted by the commercial op-
portunities that it presented. The origins of commercial broadcast-
ing reflect this divergency of view about the purposes of
broadcasting. Should broadcasting be treated as a public resource
or as a private commercial enterprise?
According to Asa Briggs, the BBC's monopoly over television
broadcasting was finally broken in 1954 because the commercial
lobby saw in broadcasting "a potential for profit and power which
encouraged them to struggle against any continuation of the institu-
tional status quo. '5 ' The lobby for commercial television was an
amalgam of advertising, industrial, and political interests. 60 A simi-
lar alignment of economic and political interests succeeded in intro-
ducing commercial radio in the form of ILR in 1972.
The advertising industry quite naturally was associated with
moves to commercialize radio broadcasting. It was impressed by the
medium's ability to make money, as demonstrated by experience in
-54 See T. BURNS, THE B.B.C.: PUBLIC INSTITUTION AND PRIVATE WORLD 9-10 (1977).
55 J. CURRAN & J. SEATON, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: TIlE PRESS AND BROAD-
CASTING IN BRITAIN 129 (2d ed. 1985).
56 Id. at 128-34. See R. COASE, BRITISH BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY 46-47
(1950).
57 R. COASE, supra note 56, at 49 (quoting J. REITI, BROADCAST OVER BRITAIN 81
(1924)).
58 J. CURRAN &J. SEATON, supra note 55, at 127-29.
59 A. BRIGGS, SOUND AND VISION 4 (1979).
( o H. WILSON, PRESSURE GROUP 129-50 (1961).
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Europe and the United States. Various other industrial and financial
organizations 6' brought their considerable influence to the lobby for
commercial radio. The appearance of "pirate radio stations" in 1964
was another important aspect of this campaign for commercial ra-
dio.62 The pirates illegally broadcast a mix of pop music and adver-
tisements from off-shore locations to avoid government radio
broadcasting regulations and were able to exploit a genuine demand
which was not adequately catered to by the BBC at that time.6 3
Thus, during the 1960s a powerful, if loosely aligned, lobby sup-
ported the introduction of commercial radio into the United King-
dom. They were helped by the existence of the pirates and also by
the wish of British companies to use radio to advertise their prod-
ucts. The natural political ally of this lobby for commercial radio was
the Conservative Party. A Conservative government had introduced
commercial television in 1954, and an influential section of the party
believed that the commercial opportunities in radio would further
industrial interests and the market economy. 6 4 Support for commer-
cial broadcasting within the Conservative Party was by no means
unanimous in the 1950s, 6 5 but, whatever the internal debates within
the party, by 1970 Conservative support for commercial radio was
overt. The Conservative election manifesto of that year pledged to
introduce "private enterprise radio closely linked with the local
community." 66
The arguments initially used in support of commercial radio
which enabled its introduction have contemporary significance be-
cause similar arguments can still be heard in current debates about
broadcasting policy. In 1959 supporters of commercial radio argued
that the BBC's monopoly in radio broadcasting was "contrary to the
best interests of the large listening public" because it restricted the
range of programming available to listeners and that "independent
sound broadcasting organizations" would improve the situation.6 7
The most cogent argument put forward in support of commercial
radio associated commercial radio with other forms of free enter-
prise in communications. In 1971, for example, the Conservative
t1 The most notable of these are the record companies.
62 On March 28, 1964, from a position in the English Channel, Radio Caroline, the
first pirate to broadcast "free, independent pop radio," began transmissions to southern
England with the Beatles' "Can't Buy Me Love." Lewis, Introduction, to S. HENRY & M. VON
JOEL, PIRATE RADIO: T"HEN AND Now 8 (1984). See also, id. at 34.
63 Before the Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act of 1967 closed them down, a
"dozen or so" pirate radios operated off the coast of England, broadcasting from "make-
shift studios on rusty ferries, minesweepers, freighters and abandoned World War II anti-
aircraft towers just outside the three-mile limit." They claimed 20 million listeners a week.
Pirating the Pirates, TIME, Sept. 15, 1967, at 70.
414 H. WILSON, supra note 60, at 129-30.
65 Id. at 15.
"" Conservative Party Manifesto (1970).
67 The Times (London), Nov. 26, 1959, at 12, col. 5.
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Minister for Posts and Telecommunications stated that the Labour
Party was unable "to think of any reason why commercial radio was
wrong in principle if commercial television was right." 6 8
Another frequently aired argument in favor of commercializing
radio was that commercial radio would be a local form of broadcast-
ing, in contrast to the BBC's national and regional services. Local-
ism proved to be an attractive and fruitful concept to the commercial
radio lobby. Significantly, because supporters argued that the serv-
ices were to be community based and not a purely commercial enter-
prise, the concept had public service implications. The adroit use
made of the local radio concept is demonstrated by the fact that
when commercial radio was introduced in 1972, it was in fact called
"local sound broadcasting."-69 Since no such service existed, how-
ever, the "job description" for a local radio service was a matter for
debate. Doubts were expressed at that time about what was meant
by the term "local." As The Economist put it:
[L]ocal radio must be clearly shown to have greater intrinsic virtues
than national commercial stations. That would be far from apparent
if all the goverment did was to set up a number of stations which
were local only in so far as their transmitters covered a very limited
area, while stations were virtually indistinguishable from one an-
other in their output. 70
Powerful though the lobby for commercial radio may have been,
considerable opposition both delayed the arrival of ILR and ensured
that upon its arrival it was a strictly regulated system of broadcasting,
within a public service framework. The BBC was a forceful opponent
to the introduction of commercial radio and was able to bring con-
siderable pressure to bear on governments. It attempted to demon-
strate that local radio could be run on a public service basis by
establishing a number of local radio stations in the late 1960s. 7 1 An-
other consistent source of opposition was the Labour Party, which
had opposed the introduction of ITV in 1954. In a debate in the
House of Lords in 1959 over proposals for commercial radio, the
Labour peer Lord Shackleton claimed that its supporters were
"firing the first shot in a new campaign to extend the range of com-
mercial and advertising interests into radio."' 72 The Labour govern-
ments of 1964 and 1970 supported the BBC's attempts to
undermine the case for commercial radio by allowing the BBC to
experiment with local stations and to create new services which ca-
tered to demands for pop music. 73 The Government also acted
strongly against pirate radio stations with the passage of the 1967
(8 825 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1251 (1971).
411) Sound Broadcasting Act, 1972, ch. 31, § 2(1) (emphasis added).
70 Going Commercial, THE ECONOMIST 14 (Jan. 2, 1971).
71 The BBC continues to run an extensive network of local radio stations.
72 219 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 992 (1959).
73 A primary example of this is Radio One, which broadcasts popular music only.
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Maritime Offences Act. 74 The Labour Party vigorously opposed the
1971 Sound Broadcasting Bill. In 1970, Anthony Wedgwood-Benn
summed up the Labour Party's attitude well when he wrote that
there was a need to oppose those who would put commerce before
communication, and profits before programs. 75
B. The Sound Broadcasting Act 1972
We have already seen that the Conservative Party came into gov-
ernment in 1970 promising to introduce commercial radio. In order
to carry out its manifesto commitment, it had to contend with the
British tradition of public service broadcasting and with the consid-
erable opposition to commercial radio. The resultant compromise
was the Sound Broadcasting Act of 1972.76 William Phillips claims
that "[i]n Britain commercial radio is local because of a[n] . . . acci-
dent of history.... The desire to compromise with radio's noncom-
mercial heritage ... led the Heath Government to settle for a new
service of advertisement-financed local broadcasting.' 7 7
Not too surprisingly, there was no precise definition in the Act
of a "local sound broadcast." '7 8 Section 2(3) of the Act stated that
"[i]n this Act 'local sound broadcast' means a programme which is
broadcast... from a station so constructed and operated as to have a
range of transmission limited to that which is sufficient, in normal
circumstances, to ensure adequate reception throughout a particular
locality." The weakness of this technical section was pointed out by
one Labour Member of Parliament (M.P.) who commented, "[A] lo-
cal sound broadcast is to be a sound broadcast which is local. That
does not seem to greatly advance the law of the land or the edifica-
tion of the House of Commons. '71) Later in the debate the Minister
for Posts and Telecommunications agreed that the task of defining
the concept of "locality" was to be left entirely to the discretion and
expertise of the IBA.8 0
The definition of what constitutes a "local program" was left
similarly vague in the Act: "[I]n the case of local sound broadcasting
services . . . the programmes broadcast from different stations for
reception in different localities [should] not consist of identical or
similar material to an extent inconsistent with the character of the
services as local sound broadcasting services." 8'
The 1972 Act placed the new local sound broadcasting services
74 Marine, &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, ch. 41.
75 Benn, A Socialist Policvfor Radio, 80 NEW STATESMAN 168 (1970).
76 Sound Broadcasting Act, 1972, ch. 31.
77 Phillips, The Frozen Waves: Radio in 1982, ADMAP, July 1982, at 381
78 Sound Broadcasting Act, 1972, ch. 31, § 2(3).
79 825 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1266 (1971).
8 Id. at 1258.
81 Sound Broadcasting Act, 1972, § 12, sch. 1, sec. 3.
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under broadly the same framework as ITV and by doing so paid ser-
vice to the ideas of public service broadcasting. Admittedly the pub-
lic service obligations were very loosely defined, but, had it not been
for the strength of the public service tradition and the opposition to
commercial radio, a much more loosely regulated system of broad-
casting could have been introduced.
C. The Annan Committee
The newly elected Labour Government of 1974 acted quickly to
stop any further expansion of ILR. In April 1974 it established the
Committee on the Future of Broadcasting under the chairmanship of
Lord Annan. The task before the Committee was "[t]o consider the
future of the broadcasting services in the United Kingdom . . . ; to
consider the implications for present or any recommended addi-
tional services . . . ; and to propose what constitutional, organisa-
tional and financial arrangements and what conditions should apply
to the conduct of all these services." 82
Much of the evidence before the Committee on the quality of
service provided by ILR was highly critical. A great deal of criticism
was directed at the perceived failure of IBA to hold ILR contractors
to the terms of their original applications.83 Despite such evidence,
however, the Annan Committee itself gave a cautious approval both
of the performance of the service provided by ILR stations and of the
role of the IBA. The Report concludes that:
Most of us, however, approved of the way in which the IBA had han-
dled the matter .... Too many fearsome regulations in the initial
stages can cripple commercial enterprises. We agreed with the IBA
that rigid adherence to the terms of the franchise application was
not necessarily the right policy; the stations' programming policies
should develop in the light of experience .... It was up to the Au-
thority to ensure that the programming was varied and gave a good
service to the locality.84
Yet again one sees here the desire, already evident in the 1972 Act,
to leave the discretion of the IBA largely untramelled. The Annan
Committee relied on the IBA's expertise to legitimate the Govern-
ment's policies.
Somewhat inconsistently, the Annan Committee took a critical
line on whether the IBA should continue to be responsible for the
development and regulation of ILR. The committee observed that
"the I.B.A. had tended to transpose a system of supervision devised
for . . . television services into local radio" and concluded that the
IBA had not "developed quite the right touch for supervising a very
82 FUTURE OF BROADCASTING, supra note 30, at 3.
83 Id. at 157.
84 Id. at 158.
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large number of disparate local radio stations." 85 The Committee
recommended the establishment of a Local Broadcasting Authority
to take the responsibility for all local radio services.8 6
Subsequent to the publication of the Report in March 1977, the
Labour Government produced a White Paper in July 1978.87 It re-
jected many of the Annan Committee's recommendations 88 and pro-
posed that expansion of ILR should be allowed under certain
guidelines, which suggested that "[t]he initial phase of expansion
should include .... if practicable, a station run by a non-profit-mak-
ing trust." 89 This White Paper never reached the legislative stage,
however, because of the Labour Government's fall from office in May
1979.
D. The Broadcasting Acts of 1980 and 1981
The newly elected Conservative Government published its
Broadcasting Bill in February 1980. This Bill was intended primarily
to extend the life of the IBA and to give the Authority the responsi-
bility of supervising a fourth television channel. The Bill also con-
tained a provision requiring the IBA to terminate ILR contracts after
an eight year period and to test public opinion in the areas con-
cerned before awarding new contracts. The Authority's initial re-
sponse to the draft legislation was that it would permit the IBA to
continue with existing contract procedures. 90 This would have
meant the continuation of the "rolling" contract procedures under
which the termination and renewal of contracts would have been a
privately conducted formality.
During the passage of the Bill, however, a number of M.P.s
pressed for the public re-advertisement of contracts at these eight-
year periods and for the IBA to hold public hearings during the re-
advertisement process. This concept of re-advertisement was in line
with the Government's commitment to the promotion of competi-
tion policy. Consequently, and against the wishes of the IBA, the
1980 Broadcasting Act carried a clause requiring the IBA to termi-
nate and re-advertise ILR contracts at fixed intervals. 9'
85 Id. at 160.
86 Id. at 207.
87 BROADCASTING, 1978, CMND. SER. -, No. 7294, at 603.
88 The principal recommendation that was rejected was that the IBA should cease to
be responsible for local radio services and should be replaced by a new Local Broadcasting
Authority, which would also take over responsibility for the BBC's local services. Id. See
FUTURE OF BROADCASTING, supra note 30, i 7.10, 14.3-14.9 (recommendations which the
White Paper rejected).
89 BROADCASTING, 1978, CMND. SER. -, No. 7294, at 16.
90 The Broadcasting Bill and Acconntabitity, TIM E Our, Feb. 15-21, 1980, at 59.
91 Broadcasting Act, 1980, ch. 64, § 33, reprinted in 50(2) Halsbury's Statutes of Eng-
land (3d ed. Continuation Vol. 1980).
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III. Independent Local Radio in the 1980s
A. Decline and Deregulation
The 1980s have witnessed a gradual decline in the expansion of
ILR, largely as a result of mounting economic pressures on the in-
dustry. There has been increasing concern about the financial basis
of ILR and about the difficult financial situation of many of the pro-
gram companies. ILR has not been successful at attracting advertis-
ing revenue, even though total advertising expenditure has been
expanding rapidly. By 1988 only half of the ILR companies were
making a profit. The pattern of the industry was of a small number
of large companies producing healthy profits and a large number of
small companies facing growing financial difficulties through a fail-
ure to attract sufficient advertising. 9 2 As a result of such pressures,
there has been an increasing trend towards concentration of owner-
ship in the industry, with more profitable contractors acquiring fail-
ing ILR stations. The difficult financial status of the industry has led
to growing complaints from the ILR contractors that the regulations
imposed upon them are excessively burdensome. These contractors
have targeted their fire on the public service duties to maintain a
certain quality of output and balance of programs. In November
1984 this campaign achieved partial success when the IBA an-
nounced a number of important changes in the administration and
regulation of ILR.9 3 Although the IBA took the opportunity to
stress its continuing commitments to the requirements of public ser-
vice broadcasting under the 1981 Broadcasting Act, these "deregula-
tion" measures did represent a considerable change in emphasis by
the Authority.
This change was the result of persistent lobbying by the Associa-
tion of Independent Radio Contractors (AIRC), an organization to
which the ILR program contractors belong, and the Government
putting its weight behind the AIRC. The intention was to make sav-
ings in IBA costs which could be passed on to the ILR companies
through a reduction in the level of rentals paid by the companies to
the IBA for transmitters and administration.
As part of the economy measures, ILR development on the pres-
ent basis was limited to the fifty-one areas for which contract ar-
rangements had already been made. Services for future new contract
areas, as well as extensions to existing contract areas, were to be
achieved by "forward funding." Previously, both the capital and
running costs of stations, including IBA regulation, had been met by
the IBA and recouped by the annual rentals charged to the compa-
'2 For a more optimistic view, see Phillips, Investors Tune into Radio Stocks, 84 INVES-
TORS CHRONICLE, May 27, 1988, at 39.
"'3 INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORM', IBA NEWS RELEASE 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1984).
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nies. This practice has continued for existing contracts. For future
new contract areas or extensions to present areas offered by the IBA,
contractors would be expected to adhere to "forward funding" by
meeting the full costs, including an advance payment to cover the
initial capital outlay, without support from the rest of the ILR sys-
tem. Running costs have continued to be met by an annual rental to
the IBA.
The AIRC based its arguments for less regulation by the IBA on
Government moves to deregulate telecommunications, the upsurge
in pirate activity, and the prospect of community and cable radio9 4 in
the late 1980s, as well as the forthcoming national commercial sta-
tions.115 ILR contractors submit to IBA regulation as a quid pro quo
to protect their advertising monopoly. If that monopoly is to be
eroded, then arguably the regulations should be relaxed accordingly.
The IBA emphasized, however, that the changes arose from the
poor financial state of the ILR network-two stations had collapsed
and many were trading either at a loss or too low a profit to pay a
dividend-and did not herald a shift towards deregulation.9 6 In fact,
a close examination of the measures announced by the Authority
demonstrated that they could not be viewed as anything other than
"deregulatory" in both intent and effect.
Perhaps the most significant change announced by the IBA was
that mid-term contract reviews of the program companies were to be
introduced in place of the existing biennial "roll" of contracts. The
system of "rolling" was originally devised instead of fixed-term con-
tracts. Nevertheless, under the terms of the 1981 Broadcasting Act
the IBA was obliged to re-advertise all ILR contracts at fixed peri-
ods.9 7 This new review procedure considerably reduced the Author-
ity's regulatory role.
Within the discipline of the mid-term review system and terms
of the 1981 Broadcasting Act,9 11 ILR companies were to be allowed
to diversify their business activities without seeking IBA permission.
For example, the IBA withdrew the guidelines to ILR stations on in-
volvement in publications, and contractors can now publish newspa-
94 Cable radio is the radio counterpart of cable television. It would be delivered by
the same cables used to deliver cable television services.
95 The Cable and Broadcasting Act, 1984, ch. 46, § 48, authorized the IBA to take the
initial steps towards establishing a national commercial radio service. Under the regula-
tory regime proposed in the Government's 1987 Green Paper, the national commercial
stations will be regulated by a new Radio Authority. Information on this proposal may be
found infra at notes 110-27 and accompanying text. As a national service the new commer-
cial radio network will broadcast to a much larger geographic area than the ILR stations.
It is still unclear what the exact programming format will be. For proposed standards, see
infta notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
9.J Lord Thomson, A New Role for Regulation, AIR WAVEs, Winter 1984-85, at 10.
97 Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 19.
9M Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 2(2)(a).
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pers and magazines. These guidelines stated that ILR publications
should deal "wholly or predominantly" with ILR or the Arts and
should not come out more than six times a year. 99 Advertising space
in publications had to be sold separately from the selling of radio
airtime and they could only carry enough advertising to pay their
way, but, by implication, should not be treated as profit-making.
With the withdrawal of the guidelines, ILR publishing was
deregulated.
One change very welcome to the ILR companies was that they
were to have greater freedom to raise money from shareholders
outside their geographical areas, and over their share structure gen-
erally. This was an important aspect of ILR at a time when many
companies were declaring no dividends, which was discouraging po-
tential investors. In 1984 approximately seventy-five percent of in-
vestment in ILR was in the hands of local companies or local people,
but nothing in the 1981 Broadcasting Act mandated this result. The
Act merely lists the sorts of bodies or individuals who cannot have a
"controlling"-fifty-one percent or more-interest in any station be-
cause of a conflict of interest,I) ° for example those involved in the
music industry.101 At a time when money was tight, it appeared in-
creasingly unrealistic to insist that shareholding should be local. In
one legendary case, a shareholder died and left about one hundred
shares to his son, but the IBA refused permission for him to become
a shareholder because he did not live in the area. H)2
Despite the IBA's best efforts, the financial squeeze on ILR has
continued and this squeeze has been reflected in program standards.
The drama and education output has largely disappeared and local
news coverage has been reduced. The realism of expecting each
small ILR service to fulfill public service broadcasting obligations has
been increasingly questioned. Consequently, critics have argued in
increasing numbers 113 that fresh legislation is needed to relieve the
ILR companies of many of their statutory obligations and the IBA of
many of its statutory responsibilities. The AIRC supports deregula-
tion in areas such as programming, advertising, technical standards,
hours of broadcasting, news services, and ownership of stations. 1 4
The IBA is not likely to go any further along the "deregulation"
route within the requirements of the Broadcasting Act. A fresh legis-
lative initiative would be required to effect any major changes.
l See Kelly, NS Dismay at IBA s Reduced Control, U.K. PRESS GAZETrE, Nov. 19, 1984, at
4.
10o Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 20.
1l Id. § 20(8)(a).
102 Baker, Fair Shares for Radio, The Guardian (Manchester, England), July- 3, 1984, at
19, col. 6.
103 See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT RADIO CONTRACTORS LTD., INITIAL EVIDENCE
TO TIlE HOME OFFICE COMMI'EE ON FINANCING T-tE B.B.C. (Aug. 1985).
104 Id. at 2-6.
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B. The Peacock Committee
Such a legislative initiative was recommended by the Committee
on Financing the BBC (the Peacock Committee)' 0 5 in 1986. The
Committee, although clearly not focusing specifically on the In-
dependent Broadcasting sector, did make some important recom-
mendations in relation to both ITV and ILR. The basic conclusion
of the Committee was that broadcasting in the United Kingdom
"should move towards a sophisticated market system based on con-
sumer sovereignty."' 0 6 Under such a system the public would have
"the option of purchasing the broadcasting services they require
from as many alternative sources of supply as possible."' 1 7 The
overall vision of the Committee was thus of a world where broadcast-
ing, as a result of technological developments, could be like publish-
ing. It identified "the fundamental aim of broadcasting policy" as
being "to enlarge both the freedom of choice of the consumer and
the opportunities available to programme makers to offer alternative
wares to the public."'108
The Committee clearly believed that technological develop-
ments held the key to the abandonment of the current model of
"strict" regulation of broadcasting, including pre-broadcast vetting
of programs. Yet by advocating a "consumer sovereignty" model of
broadcasting, the Peacock Committee was able to reject a free mar-
ket. The Committee noted that a laissez-faire approach to broadcast-
ing would not meet "British standards of public accountability for
the private use of public assets." 1°)t)
In relation to ILR, the Committee advocated a looser regulatory
regime in line with its philosophy as outlined above. It emphasized
the need for reform in order to allow the industry to attain some
basis of profitability.' 10 The Committee accepted the proposals of
the AIRC as to what revisions to the 1981 Broadcasting Act would be
needed to bring about the "looser regime" it envisioned.' ' ' Under
the AIRC's proposals the IBA would retain control over the alloca-
tion of frequencies and transmitter power and would continue to for-
mulate guidelines for programming and advertising, but the ILR
stations would henceforth:
(1) own their own transmitters and be responsible for broad-
casting in their franchise area;
105 FINANCING THE B.B.C., supra note 24, at 133. This committee was known as the
Peacock Committee because Professor Alan Peacock chaired it. Id. at iv.
106 Id. at 133.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 125.
109 Id. at 133.
1 10 Id. at 140.
III ld.
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(2) be permitted to accept any advertising currently acceptable
for the print media;
(3) decide their own hours of broadcasting, sources of pro-
gram material, manning levels, news-services, ownership, and techni-
cal standards;
(4) be free to carry sponsored programs; and
(5) be released from the obligation to achieve a certain quality
of output; maintain "proper balance" in programming; and provide
a service of information, education, and entertainment.' 12
The Peacock Committee concluded that "[r]egulation of the
[hard-pressed] commercial sector does little for the listener."'13 A
majority of the Committee further recommended that ILR franchises
should in the future be auctioned to the highest bidder. 114
C. The 1987 Green Paper
The Government's response to the Peacock Committee's pro-
posals in relation to ILR was contained in a Green Paper published
in early 1987.115 The Government recognized that ILR had reached
a stage of "stagnation" and that "the prognosis for the financial well-
being of ILR under the present statutory framework is poor."' 16 It
identified the cause of the financial difficulties as "increasing com-
petitive pressures, both for audiences and for advertising reve-
nue." ' 17 The Government's recommended "cure" was
unsurprising: "The ILR companies believe that a lighter and less
expensive regulatory framework is possible. A development along
these lines would be consistent with the Government's general policy
of encouraging enterprise by enhancing competition and minimising
regulation, while retaining essential protections."' 18 This last caveat
is significant, for the Green Paper still envisions a continuing role for
regulation, albeit a much less rigorous system of regulation than now
governs ILR. The Government clearly rejects any idea of a free mar-
ket in radio services based on the principle of consumer sover-
eignty. 1 19 It reasserts the traditional justification for government
regulation of broadcasting: "The frequency spectrum is a finite pub-
lic resource. For this reason, and ... considerations about frequency
planning and frequency management .... control of the spectrum
used for broadcasting must remain with the Government or a public
112 Id.
113 Id. at 141.
114 Id. at 140.
115 RADIO: CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITIES, 1987, CMND. SER. -, No. 92, at 6.
1 16 Id. 3.1, at 18.
117 Id. at 1.
I1s Id.
I'll Id. $ 4, at 20.
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authority acting on behalf of the Government."'' 20
The proposals in the Green Paper for the regulation of ILR
center around a relaxation of the public service requirements cur-
rently imposed on the industry. 121 The argument put forward is that
only the local services of the BBC should have such requirements
imposed and that the ILR companies should be freed from such con-
straints and be put in a better position to overcome their financial
difficulties. This change in. the current structure is justified on the
basis of the increased competition the ILR companies would face as a
result of the additional commercial radio services (at both national
and community level) proposed in the Green Paper.
The Green Paper envisions that the administration of both na-
tional and local independent radio services would be entrusted to a
single authority within a "light" framework of regulation. 2 2 Some
limited regulation of program content, technical standards, and own-
ership of broadcasting companies would continue, although the
companies would generally have independence in making their own
programming, financial, and transmission arrangements. This last
change would represent a major deregulatory move away from the
current system in ILR, where transmission is organized by the IBA.
One issue left unresolved in the Green Paper is whether the
IBA, subject to amending legislation, is the appropriate authority to
be responsible for the system of independent radio at both the na-
tional and local levels. In favor of the IBA is its experience of devel-
oping 'ILR and "of balancing the competing considerations of
regulation in a creative field."' 123 On balance, however, the Green
Paper concludes that the IBA is not the appropriate authority and
that the functions might be better exercised by a body distinct from
the IBA:
But, despite the real achievements which stand to its credit, there
would be some awkwardness in combining the IBA's responsibilities
as a broadcasting authority for television within a public service frame-
work with a separate role as a regulatory authority for radio under
different and lighter rules .... There is also a view ... that an au-
thority which can devote all its attention to radio-as the IBA mani-
festly cannot-would best serve the interests of the medium. On
this argument a new authority should be created. 124
The programming requirements suggested in the Green Paper
do not meet the full requirements of public service broadcasting as
defined under the 1981 Broadcasting Act, but certain programming
standards are proposed:
120 Id. 3.3(ii), at 19.
121 Id. 6.1-6.16, at 27-30.
122 Id. 7.2, at 31.
123 Id. 7.3, at 31.
124 Id.
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(1) to ensure that any news given in whatever form in pro-
grams is presented with accuracy and impartiality;
(2) to exclude from the programs all expressions of the views
and opinions of the persons providing the service on religious mat-
ters, or on matters which are of political or industrial controversy, or
relate to current public policy;
(3) to avoid allowing the views and opinions of particular per-
sons or bodies on such matters to predominate;
(4) to ensure that nothing is included in programs which of-
fends against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite
to crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling;
and
(5) to deliver the kind of services which they had promised
when applying to use the frequency. 12 5
It is debatable how "light" these requirements would prove to
be in practice, if enforced effectively. Programming requirement (4)
is in the 1981 Broadcasting Act 1'2 6 and requirements (1), (2), and (3)
have their equivalents in the present legislation. 127 Their applica-
tion in practice would entail similarly complex judgments to those
currently made by the IBA. It would also involve considerable re-
sources. For example, the principle of due impartiality in news
broadcasts is difficult to assess. In contrast to ajudgment on "incite-
ment to crime" which may be made by considering a program in iso-
lation, a judgment as to whether a radio station is being impartial
needs to be built up over a period of time. Similar considerations
would apply in assessing whether the views and opinions of the peo-
ple providing the radio service are predominating, and in assessing
the other criteria mentioned above.128
The Green Paper envisions a "reactive" rather than a "proac-
tive" regulatory regime. Only selective monitoring is proposed, with
the main trigger for enforcement action being complaints, whether
from listeners or other radio stations. 129 Radio stations, however,
would be required by the terms of their licenses to keep tape record-
ings of their broadcasts in order to facilitate the investigation of any
alleged breaches of license conditions on program content. 130
Advertising would be regulated on lines similar to those existing
at present, with the radio authority required to draw up a code regu-
125 Id. 7.7, at 32.
126 See Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 4(I)(a).
1'27 Id. §§ 4(l)(a) (equivalent of (i)); 4(2), 5(a) (equivalent of (ii)); and 4(2) (equivalent
of iii).
128 'The Future of UK Independent Radio'.- The IBA s Response to the Government Green Paper
on Radio, THE IBA's VIEW, June 1987, 28-29.
129 RADIO: CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITIES, 1987, CMND. SER. -, No. 92 7.18, at 34.
130 Id.
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lating advertising. 13 It also may be possible to loosen restrictions
on the sponsorship of radio programs, given that the services are not
to be run on a public service basis.' 3 2
IV. Conclusion
From the proposals put forward in the Green Paper, the Gov-
ernment clearly believes that ILR should be more lightly regulated
than at present. The Green Paper states a case for a new radio au-
thority to regulate all commercial radio services within a new statu-
tory framework. The Government proposes a limited range of
statutory requirements relating to program content, ownership, and
funding of services. The radio authority would regulate the services
within this statutory framework. It also would have a number of
sanctions available, including withdrawal of licenses.
In fact, the Government's proposed statutory requirements are
not as limited as the Green Paper suggests. If these requirements
are taken seriously and enforced effectively, they will involve the ra-
dio authority in complex judgments. The Government must make a
more decisive choice between a relatively expensive regulatory sys-
tem to enforce the requirements or allowing broadcasters greater
freedom.
The Government clearly favors a new radio authority, instead of
the IBA, to develop and regulate the new independent radio serv-
ices. 133 The IBA's experience of regulating ILR has been far from
easy. The criticisms made of the IBA take two general forms. First,
some critics accuse the IBA of interpreting its statutory mandate too
strictly and of imposing overly stringent regulations on the ILR com-
panies, as a consequence of which the industry has found itself in
financial difficulties. 134 Second, other critics accuse the IBA of being
too lax in applying the legislative requirements and of being overly
accommodating to the ILR companies, thereby failing to impose suf-
ficiently stringent regulations. 135 There are also critics who make
both types of criticism, claiming that the IBA has failed to strike the
right regulatory balance. 136
The validity of such criticisms is a question of individual judg-
ment, but these criticisms are sometimes misdirected at the IBA.
They are better aimed at the architects of the statutory framework
I31 Id. 7.15, at 34.
1:12 Id. 7.17, at 34.
133 BROADCASTING IN TilE '90s: COMPETITION, CHOICE AND QUALITY, 1988, CMND. SER.
-, No. 517, at 37-38.
134 See, e.g., FINANCING THE B.B.C., supra note 24, at 141.
135 See, e.g.,J. Coe, A Defence of Broadcasting Regulation: A Paper to the Manchester
Broadcasting Symposiun (Apr. 1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with the NORTHI
CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).
13'6 See, e.g., Baldwin, Cave & Jones, supra note 23.
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which has left the crucial decisions on the development of ILR to the
IBA and has imposed an inappropriate regulatory regime on the in-
dustry. Little coherent thought on broadcasting policy has been
forthcoming from the Government, with the 1987 Green Paper rep-
resenting a welcome break from tradition.
Further difficulties have arisen from the fact that many of the
provisions of the Broadcasting Act are permissive rather than
mandatory. ' 37 The Act allows the Authority large discretionary pow-
ers, leaving the drawing of the boundaries of appropriate behavior to
subsequent negotiations. One Member of Parliament made the fol-
lowing comment on the original Sound Broadcasting Bill in 1971:
"What the Bill does in essence ... is to provide a legislative and legal
framework within which the IBA will exercise its discretions. Its dis-
cretions are wide; and its discretions are virtually unlimited."' 138 As
far as this legislator was concerned "the Minister has a clear idea as
to how he wishes the Authority to behave. But he has not set them
out in the Bill, nor has he told the House of Commons how he
wishes it to be done."' 139 Some fifteen years later an IBA officer was
still able to observe that "[t]he Act is so wonderfully widely phrased
that you can read anything into it."140
The difficulty in interpreting precisely what is the IBA's legisla-
tive mandate is of significance because the giving of form and pur-
pose to concepts such as "quality" or "balance" must, of necessity,
be contentious. The existence of a broad statutory mandate inevita-
bly causes difficulties for a regulatory authority. The regulators must
give form and purpose to the abstract statements of Parliament.' 4 1
The agency is forced to engage in what Roberto Unger has called
"ad hoc balancings,"' 42 a literal application of the statutory provi-
sions or a suspension of the statutory provisions where the agency
feels that strict implementation is not vital for the success of the leg-
islative program.143 This balancing act will not normally be reduci-
ble to general rules. 144 As a consequence, a degree of confusion
about a regulatory agency's aims and policies is only to be expected.
There can be no guarantee that the priorities set by the agency will
be consistent with earlier legislative or executive expectations. Great
confusion and inconsistency bring into question the legitimacy of the
regulators' actions. The unpredictable application of the relevant
1:37 825 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1267-68 (1971).
138 Id. at 1267.
1'3 Id. at 1268.
140 The author interviewed the quoted IBA officer in 1985 and guaranteed him
anonymity.
141 Hawkins, Discretion in Making Legal Decisions, 43 WASth. & LEE L. REv. 1161, 1193-94
(1986).
142 R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 197 (1976).
143 R. KAGAN, supra note 44, at 49.
144 R. UNGER, supra note 142, at 197.
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legislative provisions causes a degree of cynicism or skepticism about
agency methods and objectives. Confusion about agency priorities
also leads to a lack of accountability. Uncertainty over objectives
makes it difficult for interested parties to evaluate how effectively the
agency is operating.
The apparent "regulatory failure" of the IBA, therefore, is the
consequence of defectively designed legislation. Philippe Nonet and
Philip Selznick observed that many instances of "regulatory failure"
occur because the intended legislative policy did not give a clear
mandate to the responsible regulatory agency.' 45 As the Managing
Director of one ILR station has remarked, "The IBA can only inter-
pret what it's got.' 46
A program of regulation can only be as strong as the relevant
legislation allows it to be. If the legislative scheme is defective, then
the regulatory agency will be unable to meet popular perceptions of
adequate and appropriate enforcement, the regulated may be able to
avoid its full impact, and those who are supposed to benefit may not
do so. 147
When Parliament creates a regulatory agency such as the IBA, it
should state as clearly as possible and in plain and unambiguous lan-
guage the appropriate objectives for the agency to pursue. This
ideal is not always attainable in practice, but it should be the aim of
legislators. As James Landis wrote some fifty years ago, "[W]isdom
in the formulation of standards, in the grant of powers, is the first
step toward realization of those hopes now so definitely held of the
administrative process." 148 The constituent Act is the legal linchpin
for the regulatory agency's activities and should seek to provide a
coherent and rational framework. 14'9 One can but hope that any fu-
ture Broadcasting Act will do just that.
145 P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWAR) RESPONSIVE
LAW 113 n.85 (1978).
146 This individual was interviewed by the author in 1985 and guaranteed anonymity.
147 Cranston, Regulation and Deregulation: General Issues, 5 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 11
(1982).
148 J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 88 (1938).
149 This is not to say that legislation could ever cater adequately for all the complexi-
ties of the issues which the agency must inevitably confront. Many questions of policy will
only come to light once the regulatory program is under way. An agency mandate that was
too specific could have the equally undesirable effect of stifling an agency and saddling it
with inappropriate restrictions. Any regulatory agency needs to be able to adapt to chang-
ing circumstances.
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